

# On the emergence of collective intelligence

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Heterodox Methods for Interpretable and Efficient Artificial Intelligence

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# Collective emergent intelligence


The group level (intelligent) behavior that emerges through the interactions of collection of individuals

- Biological neural networks, immune system, animals societies, ...

What are the local rules that allow the emergence of intelligent group level behavior?


- Discovering and understanding (interpretability)
- Mimicking the CI for solving computational tasks

How to communicate, specialize, divide the labor and cooperate?



## Social learning strategies


How to learn efficiently as a population?



(Yaman A. et al., 2022, PLOS Computational Biology)

## Biologically inspired learning

How to learn without a global loss function?



(Yaman A. et al., 2020, Evolutionary Computation)

(Yaman A. et al., 2019, GECCO)

(Yaman A. et al., 2018, GECCO)

## Phoenix project (FET-Open H2020)


How to build swarm of sensor networks to explore environments?



(Yaman A. et al., 2017, EvoStar)

## Social norms


How can cooperation emerge in self-interested lifetime-learning agents?



(Yaman A. et al., 2022, in submission)

## Distributed evolutionary learning

How to optimize networks using a distributed approach?



(Yaman A. et al., 2022, Under review)

(Yaman A., Iacca G., 2020, Applied Soft Computing)

# How to learn efficiently as a population?

**Individual learning:** can improve the behavior but involves a learning cost

**Social learning (copying the behaviors of others):** cannot innovate but provides sample-efficient learning by reducing the learning cost

However, when to copy? (social information can be less accurate)


who to copy from? (identifying individuals with reliable knowledge)

Information is a public good, what about free-riding?


- **Success-based:** copy the most successful individual
- **Conformist:** copy the majority

# Evolutionary dynamics of social learning

(a) Binary decision-making task




(b) Individual vs. conformist social learning




# What are the trade-offs of SL strategies?

(a) Binary decision-making task




- Individual learner
- Conformist
- Success-based
- Successful individual

(b) SLs on environments with low and high uncertainty



# Optimum distribution prediction uncertainty (ODPU)



(a) and (b):  $\sigma_1 = 0.4, \sigma_2 = 0.2$  and  $\sigma_1 = 0.2, \sigma_2 = 0.4$

(c) and (d) show the ODPU, formalized as the probability of sampling the highest reward value from the sub-optimum distribution



In (c) the ratios of optimum and sub-optimum: 0.05 and 0.95

In (d) the ratios of optimum and sub-optimum: are 0.5 and 0.5

(e) the relation between the ODPU and the difference in average rewards

# Meta-control hypothesis

- Different learning strategies have different sensitivities to uncertainty (e.g. Pavlovian, model-based and model-free [1])
- Meta-social learning provides effective and sample-efficient learning in social context
- Can have a high impact in real-world applications of multi-agent systems
- Can help form hypothesis for arbitration mechanisms in social learning context




[1] Sang Wan Lee, Shinsuke Shimojo, and John P O'Doherty. Neural computations underlying arbitration between model-based and model-free learning. *Neuron*, 81(3):687–699, 2014







# Learning division of labor in self-interested lifetime learning agents

(a) Spatial role distribution on grid environment



Neighborhood ( $N$ ) of focal agent:  $I_{i,j}$




(b) Settlement maintenance

Roles ( $\rho$ )	$r_t^{(i,j)}$
 Cleaner (C)	0
 Forager (F)	3
 Hunter (H)	6, if 5 or more hunters, 0, otherwise.
 Soldier (S)	0

### Role functions

- C: mitigates waste accumulation
- S: protects against adversarial attacks





(c) Common pasture

Roles ( $\rho$ )	$r_t^{(i,j)}$
 Worker (W)	0
 Herder (C - considerate)	5
 Herder (G - greedy)	10

### Role functions

- W: increases speed of resource recovery

# Learning division of labor in self-interested lifetime learning agents

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

## Role functions

- C: mitigates waste accumulation
- S: protects against adversarial attacks

without social sanctions  
(selfish)




with social sanctions



### Settlement maintenance


Roles: ■ Cleaner (C) ■ Forager (F) ■ Hunter (H) ■ Soldier (S)

(a) Lifetime learning of the role distributions with social sanctions in five groups




### Common pasture

Roles: ■ Worker (W) ■ Herder (G) ■ Herder (C)



(b) Comparison of the learning processes of five groups



# Future directions

- Social learning, cultural evolution and social norms
- Emergence of language/communication
- Human-AI interaction/cooperation

Thank you!